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ABSTRACT
Skydiving fatalities upon landing, especially during high-performance landings, have
overwhelmed the sport as one of the largest categories of fatalities. The purpose of this study was
to explore the effect of an experienced skydiver on high-performance landing fatalities since the
introduction of high-performance canopies. In addition, the study determined if experts in the
field see factors of experience as contributors to fatalities. The United States Parachute
Association fatality database published online was used to analyze the effect between skydiver
experience and high-performance landing fatalities. Five interviews were conducted with
industry experts. No statistically significant result was found relating experience to highperformance landing fatalities. Interviews were inconclusive in perceptions of experience related
to high-performance landing fatalities, however time in the sport and education was discussed by
a majority of the experts. Lack of significance and inconclusive interview results indicates no
effect was found between high-performance landing fatalities and skydiver experience.

viii

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Skydiving fatalities upon landing have overwhelmed the sport as one of the largest
categories of fatalities almost every year since 1993 with the introduction of performance
canopies, especially during high-performance landings. Over the decades skydiving has become
a popular recreational sport and as a result, safety advancements have radically changed gear and
training has evolved and improved (Hart & Griffith, 2003b). From skydiving’s introduction as a
sport, the implementation of new technology in gear, and the introduction of new flying
techniques, both during free fall and under canopy, the sport continually changes. In the instance
of canopy and landing techniques, an unfortunate rise in fatalities has occurred from an increase
in the risk with the introduction of higher performance parachute technology (Hart & Griffith,
2003b). These canopies are harder to fly skillfully and a parachutist can quickly overstep their
ability.
One of the advances was the creation of high-performance canopies that allowed for
greater maneuverability, higher speeds, greater descents, and an associated increase in the level
of risk skydivers accepted while flying them (Sitter, 2014). Before the introduction of highperformance canopies a landing fatality occurred approximately once every other year, generally
occurring when skydivers did not see and avoid obstacles (Sitter, 2014). With performance
canopies, landing fatalities in the U.S. have increased (Sitter, 2014). For the last 20 years,
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landing accidents have been the largest fatality category, about one-third of the fatalities annually
(Sitter, 2014).
Statement of the Problem
In the U.S. during 2013, according to the United States Parachute Association (USPA),
there were 24 total fatalities from a member pool of 35,616 members and 3.2 million estimated
skydives (United States Parachute Association [USPA], 2014c). Landing problems accounted for
seven of those fatalities and three of those were skydivers under high-performance canopies. The
landing problem category is defined as an occurrence where the skydiver died while attempting
to land a fully inflated (fully functioning) main or reserve canopy (USPA, 2014c). Due to the
high speeds and high descent rates of a high-performance landing under these canopies and the
turn onto final approach too near the ground to complete the landing, the skydivers could not
survive the landing (Sitter, 2014). Only one year prior in 2012, landing problems made up 36.8%
of fatalities and five out of the seven accidents were intentional low turns used to execute an
advanced landing maneuver (Sitter, 2013).
In an accident review written by Burke (2011), a Safety and Training Advisor during this
time at Skydive Arizona in Eloy, AZ, Skydive Arizona’s accidents generally trend parallel to the
nationally reported accidents. Low turns for a high speed landing are the highest of accidents
consisting of 24% of the fatalities, while the landing problems not involving low turns only
consist of 7% of the fatalities at Skydive Arizona (Burke, 2011).
The intentional low turn to the ground, or hook turn, is an abrupt turn initiated by the
skydiver that induces a dive in order to gain a higher speed. The longer the turn is maintained,
such as a 180° turn progressing to a 360° turn, the more speed is gained. To complete the landing,
the parachutist needs to convert the vertical speed into forward speed by beginning a flare. With
2

the remaining high speed during the flare, the skydiver is able to fly parallel near the ground up
to a few hundred feet without losing altitude, commonly known as a swoop. During this time a
skydiver may skim across the ground to fly for distance, speed, drag their feet over land or water,
or perform accuracy landings. This high-performance landing, the hook turn followed by the
flare or swoop, is often referred to as swooping. Many skydivers report this maneuver as fun and
challenging. Certain maneuvers, such as those listed above, have become competitive disciplines
in the sport (Vidovic & Rugai, 2007). The increase in risk with a hook turn followed by a swoop
is the skydiver’s close proximity to the ground at speeds in excess of a normal approach and up
to 75 mph (USPA, 2014c). If the turn is initiated too close to the ground, the parachutist does not
recover to level flight before contact with the ground, or at high speeds, even minor deviations in
the landing could be deadly.
Since the introduction of high-performance canopies, there have been deaths related to
landing accidents due to intentional low turns (USPA, 2014a). Within the skydiving community,
there are notions as to what may be causing the rise in landing fatalities and whether or not it is
related to
•

the experience level of the parachutist; and

•

skydivers, no matter what, are susceptible to human error (Hart & Griffith, 2003a).

There are inherent risks associated with skydiving no matter the experience or level of discipline
as in the case of high-performance landings. These areas will be discussed as possible
contributions to the rise in high-performance landing fatalities.
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Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to explore the effect of an experienced skydiver on highperformance landing maneuver fatalities since the introduction of high-performance canopies
and determine if experts in the field see factors of experience as contributors to fatalities.
Research Questions
Most studies on civilian skydiving or parachuting have focused on specific categories of
accidents and accidents related to landings over time (Hart & Griffith, 2003b). To the best of the
author’s knowledge a study has not been done to compare an individual characteristic
(experience in number of skydives) of the skydiver to the fatalities related to intentional low turn
landing accidents or ascertain a consensus among experts in the community on what an
experienced skydiver is in relation to intentional low turn landing accidents. The hypothesis was
that the skydivers’ individual characteristic (experience) has an impact on the relation to highperformance landing fatalities. The following research questions were proposed:
1. Does skydiver experience have an effect on high-performance landing fatalities?
2. What do industry professionals perceive as an experienced skydiver with relation to highperformance landing fatalities?
Literature Review
This review will include a brief history of the sport, an explanation of the highperformance landing maneuver, a review of the categories of fatalities and factors involved that
influence a skydiver during freefall and landing, including experience, currency, perception, and
skill.
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Background.
High-performance landing accidents have become a consistent leading area of skydiving
fatalities. Canopy selection recommendations are based on skydiver experience, size, and style of
flying and have been developed by professionals in the sport. Basic guidelines given in the
USPA Skydiver’s Information Manual (SIM) describe what constitutes an advanced canopy,
based on wing loading or size of canopy, and how one should choose a more advanced canopy.
However, there are no written regulations that prevent an inexperienced skydiver, or any
skydiver who may not be proficient and current, from choosing to buy or use a high-performance
canopy. Therefore, canopy size selection is not mandated in the Basic Safety Requirements
(BSR) written in the SIM (USPA, 2013). Germain (2004), through his experience with his time
in the sport, testing and design of his own parachutes, practice, and training in either normal or
high-performance landings, is trying to provide guidelines for skydivers to follow for safe
parachuting at any level of experience.
Much of the progress in flight is attributed to the introduction of the ram-air canopy.
Currently this is the only option of canopy, leaving the old round canopies of military surplus an
item of novelty. The United States Parachute Association’s (USPA) Parachutist magazine first
published a 12-part series on how to fly the ram-air canopy in 1998-1999 and about the same
time when the first high-speed landing competitions began to show up (Gibson, 2002a). This
magazine series led to a change in the USPA’s Integrated Student Program (ISP) in which
canopy flight training was included in earning the A license (Gibson, 2002a). The issue with the
12-part series and some of the educational programs available at the time was the teaching
addressed straight-in, normal approaches and did not expand on high-speed landings (Gibson,
2002a). Gibson’s (2002) six-part Parachutist series, “The Fine Art of Swoop Survival,”
5

discusses advancing from basic approaches to swooping, or high-performance landings. Higher
speed landings present more opportunities for a skydiver to make mistakes versus a straight-in,
normal approach and the results of the mistakes are more serious (Gibson, 2002a). USPA’s
Integrated Student Program A license progression provides a series of exercises to help students
understand canopy flight from the seat of their pants, through trial and error, to discover
individual canopy characteristics in response to various control inputs (Gibson, 2002a). Through
this process, students learn basic characteristics and responses of a canopy to help them
recognize personal readiness for a variety of equipment (Gibson, 2002a). In 2011, the USPA
created new canopy training recommendations in an effort to reduce canopy-related fatalities and
injuries. The result was a change in the requirements to earn a B license, specifically, canopy
control training designed to build on the A license training, testing, coach and instructor rating
courses, and methods for drop zones to separate high-performance landings from other
established landing pattern traffic (USPA Board of Directors Meeting, Denver, Colorado, 2011).
High-performance landing.
A high-performance landing is generalized as a landing other than a standard, normal
glide, straight in final approach. The landings discussed throughout this report will focus on
landings that are established by inducing a higher amount of speed through, what is referred to in
the skydiving community as a hook turn. The danger does not necessarily reside in the initiation
of the maneuver, but the recovery from the turn before contact with the ground and the extra
speed that a skydiver must carry throughout the landing flare in close proximity to the ground.
The turn may also be referred to as an intentional low turn. The Skydiver’s Information Manual
(SIM) does not recommend turning low to the ground as this is one of the biggest causes of
injury and death (USPA, 2013). Therefore, the intentional low turn to gain speed is considered
6

risky and requires good judgment, quick decision-making, training, and experience to execute
properly. For an in depth look at a high-performance landing, refer to Gibson’s (2002b, 2002c)
Parachutist articles titled “The Fine Art of Swoop Survival.”
Definition of terms.
•

Canopy: The major component of the parachute system comprised of fabric
membranes that connect to the parachute harness by suspension lines and provide
the means for the jumper to descend safely (USPA, 2014b).

•

Coach: The entry-level USPA instructional rating whose holder may teach the
general (non-method-specific sections of the first-jump course) and conduct group
freefall skills training and jumps with students, all under the supervision of a
USPA Instructor (USPA, 2014b).

•

Currency: Defined in this study as the number of participant skydives conducted
in the previous 12 months.

•

Drop Zone: Skydiving establishment or intended parachute landing area (USPA,
2014b).

•

Exit weight: The combined weight of the jumper and all his or her equipment for
that jump (USPA, 2014b).

•

Experience: Defined in this study as the total number of participant skydives
conducted in a lifetime.

•

Final approach: The final portion of flight before a skydiver lands (USPA, 2014b).

•

Full Flight: The stabilized state of hands-off canopy flight under an open and fully
functioning parachute (USPA, 2014b).
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•

High-performance landing: Defined in this study as a speed-induced landing,
initiated by a hook turn and terminating in a swoop.

•

Hook Turn: A canopy maneuver that results in a steep dive (USPA, 2014b).

•

Instructor: The holder of a USPA Instructor rating qualified in one or more of four
methods of instruction: USPA Accelerated Freefall, instructor-assisted
deployment, static line, or tandem. The mid level of the USPA instructional rating
hierarchy. A USPA Instructor may train and certify a student for the USPA A
License, supervise USPA Coaches, and is eligible for appointment as USPA
Safety & Training Advisor (USPA, 2014b).

•

Intentional low turn: Defined in this study as a turn, usually a hook turn or swoop,
that is initiated close to the ground to gain speed for a high-performance landing.

•

Landing Pattern: The deliberate flight path, usually rectangular, that a jumper uses
in the final phase of descent under canopy (USPA, 2013, p. 217)

•

License: Certificate of proficiency recognizing that a skydiver has met a specified
level of experience, skill, and knowledge. There are four classes of USPA
licenses: A, B, C and D. USPA licenses are recognized internationally through the
Federation Aeronautique Internationale (FAI) (USPA, 2014b).
o A License: The first level license which signifies that a skydiver has
advanced beyond the student phase. Persons holding a USPA A License
are able to jumpmaster themselves, perform basic group freefall jumps and
water jumps, participate in certain USPA collegiate competition events,
and pack their own main parachute (USPA, 2014b).
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o B License: The second level USPA license. Persons holding a USPA B
License are authorized to participate in the USPA collegiate 4-way
formation skydiving event, perform night jumps, and when qualified,
apply for a USPA Coach rating (USPA, 2014b).
o C License: The third level license issued by USPA. USPA C-license
holders may apply when qualified for the USPA AFF, IAD, and StaticLine Instructor ratings, ride as passenger on USPA Tandem Instructor
training and rating renewal jumps, and participate in intermediate-altitude
jumps and open field and level 1 exhibition jumps (USPA, 2014b).
o D License: The fourth and highest level or license issued by USPA. USPA
D-license holders may participate in all competitions at the national level,
apply when qualified for all USPA instructional and proficiency ratings,
and participate in high-altitude jumps (USPA, 2014b).
•

Main Parachute: A parachute worn as the primary parachute used or intended to
be used in conjunction with a reserve parachute. (FAR 105 definition) (USPA,
2014b)

•

Malfunction: The complete or partial failure of a parachute canopy to accomplish
proper opening, descent or flight characteristics (USPA, 2014b).

•

Night Jump: A skydive made from one hour after official sunset to one hour
before official sunrise. The FAA considers any jump made after sunset and before
sunrise a night jump requiring equipment specified in FAR 105 (USPA, 2014b).

•

Parachute: A fabric device that slows the descent of a falling object (USPA,
2014b). Also defined in this study as the device used for navigating and
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conducting parachutist controlled maneuvers. See also canopy and ram-air
parachute.
•

Parachutist: A person who intends to exit an aircraft while in flight using a singleharness, dual parachute system to descend to the surface (USPA, 2014b). See also
skydiver.

•

Ram-air parachute: A parachute with a canopy consisting of an upper and lower
surface that is inflated by ram air entering through specially designed openings in
the front of the canopy to form a gliding airfoil. (FAR 105 definition) (USPA,
2013, p. 220). See also canopy and parachute.

•

Reserve parachute: An approved parachute worn for emergency use to be
activated only upon failure of the main parachute or in any other emergency
where use of the main parachute is impractical or use of the main parachute would
increase risk (USPA, 2014b).

•

Safety and Training Advisor (S&TA): A local person appointed by the USPA
Regional Director as his or her representative and who is available to provide
advice and administrative assistance as the USPA representative at an individual
drop zone or specified area (USPA, 2014b).

•

Skydive:
o The descent of a person to the surface from an aircraft in flight when he or
she uses or intends to use a parachute during all or part of that descent
(USPA, 2014b).
o To jump from an aircraft with a parachute (USPA, 2014b).
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•

Skydiver: A person who engages in skydiving (USPA, 2014b). See also
parachutist.

•

Swoop:
o verb: To rapidly dive toward and then make a controlled approach relative
to a target (USPA, 2014b).
o noun: The controlled flight from above one body to meet or fly close to
another body, a stationary object, or the ground (USPA, 2014b).

•

Wing loading: The skydiver’s exit weight divided by the area of the parachute
canopy, expressed in the United States in pounds per square foot (USPA, 2014b).

Fatality category definitions.
The following fatality definitions are taken from Sitter (2014).
•

No Pull/Low Pull: Skydiver did not initiate opening of the main or reserve
parachute in time.

•

Malfunction: Skydiver did not respond successfully to a main parachute
malfunction in time.

•

Reserve Problem: Within its normal operating envelope, the reserve system did
not save the skydiver.

•

Collision: They skydiver hit someone or something (including aircraft) in freefall
or under canopy prior to landing.

•

Landing Problem: They skydiver died while attempting to land a fully inflated
main or reserve parachute.

•

Other: Deaths that do not fit into any of the other five categories.
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Human Elements.
Sports are voluntary activities and individuals are attracted by the needs specific to each
individual sport. Anxiety, sensation seeking, stress, experience, and skill might be necessary
components in predicting participation in sports involving high levels of personal risk
(Zuckerman, 1983). Zuckerman (1979a) defined sensation seeking as “the need for varied, novel
and complex sensations and experiences and the willingness to take physical and social risks for
the sake of such experience” (p. 10).
Involvement in skydiving is tailored to this idea of sensation seeking, but further risk
taking in the acceptance of conducting intentional low turns may support that experience may not
be enough to overcome most of the risks. However, Zuckerman (1983) points out that sensation
seekers do not take risks just to experience risk, but there has to be a reward. In the instance of
skydiving, and furthermore high-performance landings, a unique experience justifies the risk. If
it is considered that skydivers who perform advanced maneuvers are higher sensation seekers, it
is worth noting Zuckerman’s (1979b) finding that high sensation seekers tend to underestimate
risk compared to low sensation seekers.
An ability to cope with the effects of stress, particularly on mental performance, is
important to persons in high-risk environments (McClernon, McCauley, O’Connor, & Warm,
2011), such as skydiving. A definition of stress as it pertains to aviation, provided by Salas,
Driskell, and Hughes (1996), addresses stress as the process by which certain environmental
demands evoke an evaluation process in which an individual’s perceived demand exceeds
available resources and the result is undesirable psychological, physiological, or behavioral
outcomes, such as improper decisions. In other words, stress acts by restricting attention and
distracting from the primary task (McClernon et al., 2011). As demonstrated in multiple
12

experiments conducted within the skydiving environment (Allison et al., 2012; Breivik, Roth, &
Jørgensen, 1998; Hare, Wetherell, & Smith, 2013; Price & Bundesen, 2005; Roth, Breivik,
Jørgensen, & Hoffman, 1996), the perception of stress can change over time, with perceived
stress reducing over time though measured responses indicate increases in actual stress. Stress is
also a personal reaction, explained by the ability to process the demands based on an individual’s
capacity to deal with the specific situation (Thunholm, 2008). Skydiving induces high stress and
anxiety responses even after repeated skydives and shows that both experienced and
inexperienced skydivers have higher stress and anxiety during a skydive compared with their
baseline control samples (Deinzer, Kirschbaum, Gresele, & Hellhammer, 1997; Hare, Wetherell,
& Smith, 2013; Price & Bundesen, 2005). Heart rate information obtained from skydivers also
expresses this relation (Allison et al., 2012; Breivik, Roth, & Jørgensen, 1998). Noticing the
relation between elevated stress and heart rate, an increasing number of studies suggest that
stress can positively influence risky decision-making and attentiveness to threat-related cues,
resulting in fewer errors in decision-making tasks (Akinola & Mendes, 2012; Putman, Antypa,
Crysovergi, & van der Does, 2010; van den Bos, Harteveld, & Stoop, 2009). It could be
postulated that as a skydiver gains experience over a number of skydives, the initial stress felt by
the individual will perceivably fade over time, though studies confirm that actual stress levels
remain high during the skydive.
In skydiving, threat-related cues are the freefall, execution of the high-risk, highperformance low turns, hazardous attitudes, unfamiliar locations, or handling the parachute in
unfamiliar conditions, such as different weather or density altitudes than normally experienced.
In contrast to observed and gathered data from skydivers, the self-reported levels of stress and
anxiety indicate that as a skydiver has more experience, they perceive less stress and anxiety,
13

though actual measured values compared to novices are higher during activity than at baseline
controls (Hare, Wetherell, & Smith, 2013; Roth, Breivik, Jørgensen, & Hoffman, 1996).
A theory of the effects of pressure on motor performance, based on psychologists
Michael Eysenck and Manuel Calvo’s work, which describes the effects of anxiety, states that
anxiety consumes our awareness through worry and that when it has been consumed to the point
where no additional resources remain focused to on-task awareness, performance degrades, and
our effort increases (Cooke, Kavussanu, McIntyre, Boardley, & Ring, 2011). Competitive
pressure affects psychological, physiological, and kinematic variables through the observation of
expert golfers in a putting experiment (Cooke et al., 2011). Increased effort can enhance
performance by devoting additional resources that increase the amount of awareness given to a
task; however, awareness given to a task that has been learned to the level of automaticity can
cause a disruption of performance in experts (Cooke et al., 2011). The addition of competitive
pressure has also been shown to have an effect on motor performance, through increased muscle
tension, changes in movement such as increased jerkiness and decreased smoothness, and
increases in heart rate which can reflect increases in anxiety (Cooke et al., 2011). The reports
that are provided through the USPA concerning high-performance landing fatalities do not
indicate the environment the parachutist was flying in, such as a practice attempt, a routine
landing, or one conducted at a competition. Though the fatalities may not have occurred during
competition, the increased demand of a high-performance landing performed at a personal,
competitive level as the individual trains for competition or personal development, induces an
increase of pressure on the individual since timing, judgment and decision-making are quick and
critical.
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Under the natural environment of skydiving, quick decision-making is a matter of life,
serious injury, or death (USPA, 2013). Wiggins and Bollwerk (2006) define decision making as
an information processing strategy. The process is acquiring, examining, and acting upon
information and it is based on the demands of the task and is dependent upon the knowledge and
experience of the decision maker. Decision-making models in aviation are credited to Drucker
(1954), a famed business management scholar and author and the models are considered classic
decision making models. Many decision-making models are prescriptive, or prompt a response
after something has already happened. Decision-making models are impractical where decisions
are made under time pressure (Bertrand, 2005). Like Ordóñez and Benson (1997), Bertrand
(2005) explains the classic model allows sufficient time to generate options, consequences are
not immediate, input is gathered from others and the workload is manageable. Bertrand (2005)
suggests a naturalistic decision making model for those working in time sensitive environments,
or a model for the way people will actually make decisions in a natural setting. It is a model
where “good enough,” considering time constraints, won’t allow for the best or perfect option
(Bertrand, 2005).
Skydivers have to make decisions under critical time pressure and under increased levels
of stress all while depending on themselves to land safely. The high workload and demanding
tasks quickly add up and place strain on the ability to make clear and quick decisions (Ordóñez
& Benson, 1997; Starcke & Brand, 2012). Though the level of risk taken can change depending
on the style of skydiving, size of the canopy, and level of performance during landing, decisionmaking at any point can affect the remainder of the landing sequence. Working in the skydiving
environment requires fast decisions.

15

Decision-making situations induce stress on an individual (Starcke & Brand, 2012).
Other important factors in decision-making are the influences of stress on cognitive and
emotional functioning (Starcke, Polzer, Wolf, & Brand, 2011). Starcke and Brand (2012) quickly
point out strategic decisions are not always well calculated by humans, for example, decisions
may be made based on biases, previous heuristics, or other intuitive tendencies.
Many decisions made under stress may provoke stress responses themselves (Starcke &
Brand, 2012). In skydiving, the event itself induces stress and has a compounding affect by not
only altering decision-making but increasing the stress of making the decision to skydive or
complete a high-performance landing. In skydiving, stress and decision-making are intimately
connected. The consequences for proper decision-making are high in skydiving as the
environment is considered high-risk and the potential for injury or death is significant.
Participating in voluntary higher-risk maneuvers compounds the issue. Akinola and Mendes
(2012) discuss that stress can enhance selective attention to threat-related cues (shoot/don’t shoot
scenarios for police officers) and making decisions that help avoid danger could be facilitated in
high-stress states. In relation to all areas of skydiving, not only higher risk, high-performance
landings, the threat could be associated to hazardous attitudes, unfamiliar locations such as off
airport landings, or handling the parachute in unfamiliar conditions such as turbulence or weather
not normally experienced.
A high-performance landing in skydiving is a product of years of practice, thousands of
attempts, and executing this maneuver is seen as an impressive accomplishment among those in
the skydiving community. Though these high-risk maneuvers are voluntary and intentional, at
the moment of execution, stress and anxiety could play a part in the decision-making throughout
the entirety of the landing sequence. Section 6: Advanced Progression of the USPA Skydiver’s
16

Information Manual (SIM) (USPA, 2013) addresses advanced canopy piloting topics but does
not include the high demand on decision making in this environment. However, under Section 611, subpart G, Item 3:
USPA warns all jumpers that some of the maneuvers described to develop an
understanding of canopy flight involve a greater risk of injury, even serious injury or
death, than a routine parachute landing using a straight-in approach flown at the canopy’s
natural speed until flaring. (USPA, 2013, p. 153)
This new or additional stress, anxiety, and risk experienced during high-performance landings
can increase risk in decision making and can lead to an increased potential for injury or death
(Putman, Antypa, Crysovergi, & van der Does, 2010; van den Bos, Harteveld, & Stoop, 2009).
Similar to aviation, human error aspects related to accidents and incidents are applied to
the parachutist as well. Hart and Griffith (2003a) reviewed 308 skydiving fatalities that were
reported between 1993-2001 and found that 264, or 86% were categorized as human error. Hart,
Griffith and Randell (2006) found an 82% human error fault out of the 125 fatalities from 20002004. Human error does not have a universally agreed upon definition but Reason (2008)
defines error as a deviation. Deviations may include physical deviations, mental slips or mental
lapses, or deviation from a predetermined plan. Human error contained any accident where the
principal causes were errors, inappropriate actions, inattention, or omission of important actions
(Hart & Griffith, 2003a; Hart, Griffith, & Randell, 2006). Skydiving takes place in an
environment likely contributing to the influence of human error accidents, such as working under
extreme time pressure, under high anxiety, and under arousal states (Hart & Griffith, 2003a).
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Experience, skill, and perception.
How a parachutist trains, practices, or plays may be influenced by the individual’s
experience, which in turn has an influence on how the individual learns, and the complexity of
the task (Panchuk, Spittle, Johnston, & Spittle, 2013). Cooke, Kavussanu, McIntyre, Boardley,
and Ring (2011), while studying the performance of expert golfers completing a putting
experiment, presented that pressure affects the behavior of an expert by having a positive effect
on performance. Egan, Verheul, and Savelsbergh (2007) observed soccer players kicking a
moving ball and noticed that the integration of the control of timing of the ball movement with
the speed of the individual’s movement was a skill more developed in experienced soccer players,
or those with competitive experience. The skilled performers display flexibility of movement
each time they are presented with a new task, modifying their movements any time they perceive
the situation is changing (Egan, Verheul, & Savelsbergh, 2007). Czyz et al. (2013) explores
especial skill, or a developed skill that produces an advantage in performance based on practice
from large amounts of repeating a specific action. “The amount of practice, not necessarily the
years of practice maybe a better determinant of the especial skill effect,” (Czyz et al., 2013, p.
149). Learning from practice at a single drop zone, choosing to fly during similar weather
conditions, time of day, etc., develops into repetitive actions and a level of comfort within a
particular environment and this occurs variably depending on the skydiver. The decision to
skydive as often or as seldom as one chooses is an individual choice, will affect the currency,
and overall experience.
The lack of information within the USPA descriptive reports may not include location of
most accidents, description of landing by the parachutist, or whether or not that individual was
flying in familiar territory. Information is often unreported. However, Burke (2011) cites,
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“visiting jumpers are 5.1 times more likely to die on any given jump at Skydive Arizona than
local jumpers” (The Local Knowledge Factor section, para. 2). Burke (2011) continues that
visitors to the drop zone incur fatal accidents 20% higher compared to the national average. Czyz
et al. (2013) reported, a learned, selectively specific skill creates an environment of optimal
parameters for a set basketball shot. With a change in parameters of the set basketball shot,
experienced players’ movements changed by using a heavier ball and the automaticity that
underlies the especial skill may have been the disrupted component of the action (Breslin,
Hodges, Kennedy, Hanlon, & Williams, 2010). Compare to skydivers in a normal landing pattern
and approach at a familiar drop zone. Out of a familiar environment, the performance of a
landing done correctly based on that familiar environment may results in the incorrect
application in new situations, causing an accident. Burke (2011) associates poor training to the
increased risk to visiting skydivers at Skydive Arizona, especially poor landing pattern planning.
Resilience to the effects of fatigue, distraction, competitive pressure, or performance anxiety on
the automaticity of the especial skill and its application was unclear (Czyz et al., 2013).
Unfortunately, these effects are major contributing factors to human error within the aviation
environment (Reason, 2008) and correspondingly so in skydiving flight.
Researching perceived abilities, Kruger and Dunning (1999) proposed that incompetence
skewed ability to recognize one’s poor performance. Kruger and Dunning (1999) found a dual
effect of experience: unskilled participants perform poorly and fail to realize it; and extremely
skilled participants who perform well fail to realize that the success was not shared by the other
participants. Dunning, Johnson, Ehrlinger, and Kruger (2003) question whether or not one can be
in a position to self-assess skills and experience accurately or even have the ability to do so. “For
success to occur, many things must go right: The person must be skilled, apply effort, and
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perhaps be a bit lucky. For failure to occur, the lack of any one of these components is sufficient”
(Kruger & Dunning, 1999, p. 1131).
Decision-making (Bertrand, 2005; Starcke, Polzer, Wolf, & Brand, 2011), anxiety and
perception of stress versus actual stress (Hare, Wetherell, & Smith, 2013; Price & Bundesen,
2005) play a role in developing experience. Skydivers too are prone to human errors (Hart &
Griffith, 2003a) and whether or not learning takes place from the errors will determine
contributions to experience and to landing problems (Burke, 2011). The combination of these
effects will pose a problem in clearly defining experience and the relation to high-performance
landing fatalities. Experience also has to be weighed carefully as there are positive and negative
effects to falling into this title (Cooke, Kavussanu, McIntyre, Boardley, & Ring, 2011; Egan,
Verheul, & Savelsbergh, 2007).
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CHAPTER II
METHOD
Limitations in the current literature support further analysis of skydiving fatalities and the
intentional low turn landing fatalities. In addition to the limited number of studies conducted
within skydiving, there are even fewer studies that look into relationships of skydiver
characteristics, such as experience, and high-performance landing fatalities. Although the current
literature has explored skydiving fatalities, it does not provide an in depth look at the details of
high-performance landing fatalities and the experience of a skydiver.
At this point, no studies have statistically analyzed the effect between skydiver
experience on intentional low turn landing fatalities or made an attempt at finding a consensus on
what an experienced skydiver is in regards to high-performance landings. The following method
will examine skydivers in the U.S. on these two areas.
Population
The United States Parachuting Association (USPA) group membership pool was the
objective population for the statistical analysis. From the membership pool, the USPA creates a
database from those skydivers that have suffered a fatality in the U.S. and categorizes them
according to the accident type. The USPA fatality database was the target population for the
current study. The annual report and definitions used by Sitter (2014) were used to classify the
fatalities into six categories. The categories include (a) no pull/low pull, (b) malfunction, (c)
reserve problem, (d) collision, (e) landing problem, and (f) other.
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In order to answer the second research question, six experts within the industry were
contacted for interviews to obtain subjective views on the topic and determine a consensus on
skydiver experience and potential causes of high-performance landing fatalities.
Sample
From the USPA fatality database, the fatalities that were further described as intentional
low turn landing accidents, hook turn accidents, high-speed induced accidents, or swoop
accidents were categorized as high-performance landings, analyzed, and compared to skydiver
experience.
The experts were chosen based on criteria such as their leadership within the industry,
positions they have held or are holding within the industry, the knowledge and technology they
provide to the industry, and the time they have spent as participants or working professionals
within the skydiving industry.
Procedure
Information regarding U.S. related skydiving fatalities was gathered from the USPA
Accident Reports (USPA, 2014a). Data categorized as “Landing Problems” were further broken
down into high-performance landing fatalities if they met the criteria of being described in the
fatality report as an intentional low turn, hook turn, high speed induced, or swoop accident, and
other fatalities for all other landing related fatalities. The University of North Dakota’s
Institutional Review Board was consulted and board approval was not deemed necessary due to
the public accessibility of the data, which has already been de-identified by the USPA. The
USPA reports are compiled from various reporting sources and often may include missing data
in one or any of the fields of the skydivers’ characteristics (age, experience, etc.). For instance, in
the case of experience, the numbers may have been gathered from the skydiver’s logbook – self22

reported data – or obtained as a best guess from what was last known, estimating how long that
skydiver has been in the sport. Some of the information reported was also an estimate. For
example, the report might have indicated that the skydiver was involved in the sport for 13-plus
years or had 2,800-plus skydives. This author, without having any further way to obtain more
specific data, used those numbers on the assumption that the skydiver had at least the minimum
reported value, so 13-plus years in the sport was rounded to 13 years or 2,800-plus skydives was
rounded to 2,800 skydives. This represents an error in the accuracy of the reporting procedures
and translates into error in the accuracy of the statistical test results.
The University of North Dakota’s Institutional Review Board approval was required for
the expert interviews and approved the research and interview protocol prior to conducting the
interviews. Experts were contacted via email for interview requests and asked to submit an
electronic informed consent form (Appendix A) before beginning the study. All participants
completed the informed consent form before the interviews were conducted. The interview was
conducted via telephone and recorded using TapeACall software.
Analysis of Data
USPA fatality data reviewed as defined in the procedures process was analyzed using
IBM SPSS version 23 software. An independent t-test analysis was used to test the significance
between the independent variable (high-performance landing fatalities) and the dependent
variable (experience). The t-test compared the experience of the skydivers in the highperformance landing fatality group to the experience of skydivers in the other landing fatality
group. A determination of significance was made between experience and fatalities after
analyzing the fatality data. Interview recordings were reviewed to determine if there were
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commonalities among industry professionals’ perceptions on what an experienced skydiver is
and how that relates to high-performance landing fatalities.
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Statistical Analysis of Fatality Data
From the United States Parachute Association’s (USPA) fatality database, 60 total
fatalities created the data set with high-performance landing fatalities consisting of half of all
reported landing fatalities (N = 30). Landing accidents were analyzed and Tables 1 and 2 show
the characteristics of the skydivers. Table 1 indicates the average age of a skydiver involved in a
landing fatality was 39.25 years (N = 59) with the youngest skydiver being 21 and the oldest
being 72. The average time the skydiver was in the sport in number of years was 9.93 years (N =
54), with the minimum time of 0 years and the maximum time of 35 years. Experience measured
through the number of skydives was a mean of 1730.72 skydives (N = 60) with a minimum
number of skydives of 1 and a maximum number of 11000.
Table 1. Skydiver Characteristics.
Age
Time in Sport in Years
Experience by Number of Skydives

N
59
54
60

Min
21
0
1

Max
72
35
11,000

Mean
39.25
9.93
1,730.72

Range
51
35
10,999

Table 2 details the distribution of the gender of skydivers and also includes the
distribution of high-performance and other landing fatalities. Gender distribution in percent
indicates a small female population of 10% (N = 6). The landing fatality categories however, are
split with each group consisting of 50% of the fatalities (N = 30).
An independent samples t-test using a 95% confidence interval was run to determine
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Table 2. Distributions.
Gender of Skydiver

Male
Female
Total

Type of Landing Fatality

High-Performance
Landing Fatality
Other Landing
Fatality
Total

Frequency
53
6
59

Percent
88.3
10.0
98.3

Valid Percent
89.8
10.2
100.0

30

50.0

50

30

50.0

50

60

100.0

100.0

what effect exists between skydiver experience, using the number of skydives, and landing
fatalities. Tables 3 and 4 provide the results of the test. Levene’s test for equality of variance is
not significant (p > .05) and the variances between groups are not significantly different. Equal
variances assumed was then used in which there was not a statistically significant difference (p
= .23) between experience and high-performance landing fatalities or other landing fatalities and
an effect cannot be determined.
Table 3. Group Statistics.
Type of Landing
High-Performance
Landing Fatality
Other Landing Fatality

Experience by Number of
Skydives

N

Mean

Std.
Deviation

Std. Error
Mean

30

2,070.57

2,267.59

414.00

30

1,390.87

2,048.79

374.06

Table 4. Independent Samples t-test: Experience Effect on Fatality Type.
Levene’s
Test for
Equality of
Variances

F
Experience Equal
by Number of variances
.04
Skydives
assumed
Equal
variances not
assumed

t-test for Equality of Means

Sig.

t

df

.85

1.22

58

1.22 57.41
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Sig (2Mean
Std. Error
tailed) Difference Difference

95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Lower Upper

.23

679.70

557.96

-437.17 1,796.57

.23

679.70

557.96

-437.42 1,796.82

On average, skydiver experience did not have a significant effect on high-performance
landing fatalities (M = 2070.57, SE = 414.00) compared to other landing fatalities (M = 1390.87,
SE = 374.06), t(58) = 1.22, p > .05, and represents a small-sized effect, r = .16. The small effect
size indicates a non-substantial effect and can partly be attributed to the small sample size.
Findings from the Skydiving Experts Interviews
The results from the expert interviews are presented from the information gathered in the
interview protocol (Appendix B). Not all questions or statements from the interview protocol are
presented. The descriptions below include data most pertinent to answering the research question
or support the research question. For example, the first question regarding personal information
was used to help the interviewee relax by answering simple questions related to their skydiving
experience. This introductory question confirmed information about the roles participants have
held or currently hold within the community to establish them as knowledgeable experts within
the field.
Six potential participants were contacted, five male and one female. One of the
participants declined the interview. The results reflect the five remaining participants’ answers.
Responses to interview questions.
With regard to the community perception of landing fatalities rising over the years, all
five experts were in agreement with the numbers reported in the annual fatality report and
personal involvement in the sport. Within the interviews, additional information was provided by
the participants on what may be overall contributing factors. Participants 2, 3 and 4 contributed
with statements that reflect the change in gear, as indicated by Sitter (2014), has lead to issues.
For example, the gear is more radical and requires a much higher level of skill to control and fly
safely. At the same time, the gear provides a much easier landing leading to use of smaller, faster
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canopies, which could still be perceivably landed safely (Participant 4). Participant 4 discussed
in the interview that the landings on newer canopies were softer and easier than ever before and
there was a simultaneous shift in realizing that the soft, easier landings were possible under faster
canopies. The consequence of faster, easier to fly parachutes is a decrease in time to respond to
changes with gaining a comfort in the parachute capabilities but being unaware of one’s own
ability to handle the more advanced gear (Participant 4). Participant 3 sees that skydivers are
being driven to fly faster parachutes and this too comes with the consequence of not
understanding what is involved.
Experience involves multiple factors, which could include time in the sport, how many
total skydives members have, how many skydives completed recently, what discipline (tandem
flying, accuracy canopy flying, etc.), and maybe most challenging, how well do they make
decisions. Participants were asked to define experience in the interview without reference to
skydiving numbers. Given the complex factors involved in forming a personal opinion on
defining experience, the participant answers varied considerably, but simultaneously centered on
the defining idea of “it depends.” Participant 4 had to preclude the answer with “to make a
definition of what is an experienced skydiver is a futile and a meaningless exercise unless you
put it in context.” The participants included in the definitions that an experienced skydiver
should have skydived in a variety of conditions, have a great deal of understanding, be current –
which is another topic to consider on its own – consider a specific discipline or consider an
overall view, attaining enough time in the sport, and even considerations such as courtesy and
maturity. While a consensus was not reached when asked to define experience, two themes
emerged. A majority of interviewees (3 out of 5) mentioned putting in a lot of time and
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continuing with education. Participant 5 described gaining experience is about “attaining enough
time in the sport… to learn from our mistakes.”
The question pertinent to experience required for undertaking advanced landing
maneuvers also revolves around experience and the complexities of subjectively defining it; the
participants responded with a variety of answers. As Participant 5 responded, the stage when one
could begin advanced maneuvers has to be taken in context and “it’s about education and it’s
about empowering people… to attain the necessary experience…” Participant 2 recognized the
skydiver should add additional canopy maneuvers, be task oriented, start advancing after the
basics have been learned for the reason that you have to know how the parachute works and flies.
Participant 1 mentioned, “sooner or later you are going to be surprised… are you going to
overreact, underreact, or react just the right amount.” Proper handling of the parachute will result
in a desirable outcome. Education is a key point in lowering the accident and fatality rate in the
landing portion, or more importantly the time spent flying the parachute (Participant 1, 5). Only
Participant 3 put a requirement in terms of numbers, that “the average skydiver is not ready to
generate any extra airspeed before 200 jumps.” In regards to discussion with Participant 3, this
statement indicates using any maneuver to create that extra airspeed in close proximity to the
ground for landing but not the exclusion during maneuvering at a safe altitude in order to gain
canopy handling proficiency. No central themes carried through all of the participants’ answers
on what level of experience should be required to start advanced landing maneuvers and a
consensus was not reached.

29

CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
Implication of Results
Statistical reflection.
The statistical analysis did not show significance between the effect of experience and
type of landing fatality. Another outcome of the statistical analysis was skydivers who suffered
from high-performance landing fatalities had a higher mean number of skydives than those who
suffered from other landing fatalities. While not statistically significant, an explanation for these
results is that it takes a reasonable amount of learning, skill acquisition, and practice, which
amounts to higher experience as measured by number of skydives, in order to perform an
advanced landing maneuver. This explanation is similar to an observation Czyz et al. (2013)
found in review of massive practice developing an especial skill. There are no limitations on
performing advanced landing maneuvers from the very first skydive, however, the typical
progression of skill and understanding lead to the relationship of more experience before
beginning advanced maneuver training.
Interview reflection.
Though the question about community perception was directed at gathering opinions
about what they have seen personally, the strong bias of having that information published as a
constant reminder of where fatalities occur may have clouded over the desired response.
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The culture of skydiving, in the opinion of the experts, has changed. Participant 1 stated that
older, smaller drop zones had a lot more control over what was taking place. A much greater
family atmosphere and more experienced skydivers, safety officers, or even close friends took a
bigger initiative in looking after a skydiver. This could include a thorough gear check for a
visitor to the drop zone, requiring a demonstration of emergency procedures, or limiting what the
skydiver can do until abilities have been demonstrated. Education is available to help learning to
fly more advanced maneuvers, but not all skydivers seek it out or the training might not be
readily available largely due to financial cost of the course or travel to get to a location that
offers training (Participant 3). Kruger and Dunning (1999) suggest teaching participants the
skills to recognize incompetence and recognize previous errors to avoid repeating the errors.
Table 5 depicts the experience criteria used within current literature in the left column
and participants with shared criteria in the remaining columns. Experience was not clearly
defined in the literature and further reflected in the interviewee’s answers. Consider Breslin,
Hodges, Kennedy, Hanlon, and Williams (2010) used 10 years of experience within the sport and
did not discuss how they chose years in lieu of age or how they chose 10 years as qualifying as
an expert. Defining experience presented a challenge for most of the participants as it was geared
toward personal definitions.
It was important that experience be described without the use of numbers to expand on
the complexity of what is involved in gaining experience and how numbers of skydives cannot
completely quantify experience. One of the two themes focused on putting in a lot of time, but
no participants described what a lot of time is and how that defines an experienced skydiver. The
other theme revolving around education was also not clearly defined resulting in a concept of
experience but without a clear path to attain experience. Experience not being clearly defined
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Table 5. Experience Overview: Literature Compared to Participant Response
Time
Compete
Continue Learning
Leader/Teacher
Current
Variety
Decision-making

Participant 1
X
X
X
X

Participant 2

Participant 3
X

Participant 4

Participant 5
X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X
X
X

X

X
X

Note. Literature experience criteria obtained from (Breslin, Hodges, Kennedy, Hanlon, &
Williams, 2010; Cooke, Kavussanu, McIntyre, Boardley, & Ring, 2011; Czyz et al., 2013;
Demirhan, 2005; Egan, Verheul, & Savelsbergh, 2007; Gautier, Thouvarecq, & Larue, 2008;
Keetch, Schmidt, Lee, & Young, 2005; Panchuk, Spittle, Johnston, & Spittle, 2013).
reflects what was found in current literature. Without significance in the t-test, an indicator that
did not create a result pointing toward an experience level based on numbers of skydives, it
could be expected there might be some ambiguity in personally defining experience and how to
apply that to advanced landing maneuvers. Through multiple interview questions, not only when
asked to specifically define what experience is, education was cited within each participant’s
response in relation to experience and it appears education is an important factor of experience.
Table 5 also includes remarks that were given with regard to any interview response describing
experience, or experience required for advanced maneuvers. Though all participants mentioned
education and it could be viewed, based on Table 5, that a consensus was reached, education was
not cited as the one component used to define experience nor was an explanation provided on
what or how much education makes experience. Expanding on the first question asked of
experience, participants also had difficulties describing the experience required for advanced
maneuvers. The responses varied between all individuals, leaving the question of experience and
the effect on high-performance landings open for further research.
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Limitations of the Study
Limitations of the current study include self-reported data and author bias. Information
furnished to the USPA was self-reported, which adds to the possibility of error in the data that
was given, recorded, and published. Errors in reporting will add to the error in the analysis. Some
of the information was not reported accurately and the author made singular interpretations with
the information to most accurately analyze the data. Only the author and one expert within the
industry reviewed the fatality data from the United States Parachute Association’s (USPA)
database. There was not a third party review of the fatality data to determine final consensus of
the categorization of the landing fatalities. This task was somewhat complicated by the
sensitivity of the topic and the ability of those with the most accurate information being able to
ethically share that information. The interviews were conducted and interpreted solely by the
author.
Continuation of Research
A test to further explore the possibility of significance of being involved with a highperformance landing fatality would involve defining a level of experience, based on number of
skydives, at which a skydiver would be considered an expert. The characteristic of experience by
number of skydives could be broken into low experience and high experience. A 2 x 2 factorial
ANOVA could then be run using the level of experience categories against the landing fatality
categories. A consideration that was not involved in this study was to define at what level of
experience, as determined by number of skydives, could be used to determine skydiver
experience. It may take a larger panel of experts or a survey instrument sent to the skydiving
community for an appropriate sampling to determine at what skydive number, or range, a
skydiver could be considered an expert. Development of an especial skill may not define at what
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skydive number experience is achieved, but a study conducted in a manner similar to Czyz et al.
(2013) may help demonstrate how much practice is involved in reaching an advantage in
performance or what type of practice is required to get that advantage (Panchuk, Spittle,
Johnston, & Spittle, 2013).
Further research using a larger panel of reviewers in determining the causes of fatalities
and a larger panel of interviewees to assist in interpreting participant answers may provide a
broader and more accurate view of the skydiving industry. A better or more clear-cut
understanding of what defines a parachutist as an expert would also provide transparency to the
industry and may assist in creating guidelines or training procedures geared for individuals trying
to figure out where they stand as a beginner, intermediate or advanced parachutist in a
categorical world. With a consensus among skydiving professionals and the skydiving
community, defining a level of experience with a number may allow for a point where a skydiver
can determine if the risks could be undertaken safely and where the United States Parachute
Association, coaches, manufacturers, etc., can develop training or rules to enhance safety. If
future researchers could identify during the landing when, or what, may have caused an error
leading to a fatality, further studies on how those errors disrupt automaticity and lead to outcome
changes that end in an accident or fatality could be analyzed. For example, other data collected
that may help identify these errors are: entry and exit velocity from the high-performance landing
maneuver, variability of velocity throughout, changes in the flight pattern structured off of a
standard landing pattern, and other variables associated with a high-performance landing. A
better understanding of the effects of experience on a parachutist may open a new door to
understanding better training techniques required to overcome the more complex risks of higher
performance maneuvers, both physically and mentally.
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Conclusions
Limited research is available in the sport of skydiving and that which does exist does not
explore the topic of experience with a relation to high-performance landing fatalities. Current
literature does not provide a conclusive definition of experience, which can be seen in the results
of this study through both the non-significance in the statistical analysis and the indefiniteness in
the Participants’ interview answers. Within the context of the research parameters, statistical
significance was not found; thus, no significant effect exists between high-performance landing
fatalities and skydiver experience. Other factors not included in the analysis contain elements of
the human contribution to performing a skydiving landing. These elements include decisionmaking, stress, anxiety, community culture, time pressure, and perceptions of any of the areas by
the individual skydiver. Determining contributing factors of high-performance landing fatalities,
continued efforts in defining experience, and obtaining real-time data for error mapping may be a
way to educate skydivers and reduce the possibility of committing a fatal error.
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APPENDICES

Appendix A
Consent Form

The University of North Dakota
Consent to Participate in Research
TITLE:

Skydiver Experience and the Relation to HighPerformance Landing Fatalities

PROJECT DIRECTOR:

Gregory Bodensteiner

PHONE #

701.899.4023

DEPARTMENT:

Aviation

STATEMENT OF RESEARCH
A person who is to participate in the research must give his or her informed consent to
such participation. This consent must be based on an understanding of the nature and
risks of the research. This document provides information that is important for this
understanding. Research projects include only subjects who choose to take part. Please
take your time in making your decision as to whether to participate. If you have questions
at any time, please ask.
WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY?
You are invited to be in a research study about skydiver experience and the relation to
fatalities because you have been identified as an expert within the industry with valued
opinions and statements regarding this area of research.
The purpose of this research study is to explore the relationship between an experienced
skydiver and high-performance landing maneuver fatalities involved since the
introduction of high-performance canopies. The hypothesis is skydiver experience has an
impact on landing fatalities. Information being sought through personal interviews
pertains to personal opinions on the theoretical definition of what skydiver experience is
and that relationship to the landing fatalities.
HOW MANY PEOPLE WILL PARTICIPATE?
Approximately six people will take part in this study through phone interviews.
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HOW LONG WILL I BE IN THIS STUDY?
Your participation in the study will last approximately 45-90 minutes. You will
participate in an interview by phone at your convenience.
WHAT WILL HAPPEN DURING THIS STUDY?
You will be contacted at a convenient time that has been arranged by you and the
principal investigator. During the interview you will be asked a series of questions
regarding your personal experience and knowledge with relation to what is skydiver
experience and the relation to high-performance landing fatalities. You are free to skip
any question throughout the interview if you prefer not to answer and may end the
interview at any time.
WHAT ARE THE RISKS OF THE STUDY?
There may be some risk from being in this study. Some questions may be of a sensitive
nature and you may therefore become upset as a result. However, such risk is minimal. If,
however, you become upset by questions, you may stop at any time or choose not to
answer a question. If you would like to talk to someone about your feelings about this
study, you are encouraged to seek help. For those participants who may have an adverse
emotional reaction due to the nature of the subject content, The University of North
Dakota Counseling center is available at 701.777. 2127. Participants may also call 2-1-1
any time of day to be connected with local resources, such as FirstLink (myfirstlink.org)
in the North Dakota area, which provides assistance to identify, access, and make
effective use of community and volunteer resources 24 hours a day.
WHAT ARE THE BENEFITS OF THIS STUDY?
You may not benefit personally from being in this study. However, we hope that in the
future other people might benefit from this study because it provides a scientific
assessment of landing fatalities in skydiving and expert insights into the potential to
enhance the understanding of landing issues in the skydiving community.
WILL IT COST ME ANYTHING TO BE IN THIS STUDY?
Costs associated with the study are personal time and costs associated with time spent on
the phone.
WILL I BE PAID FOR PARTICIPATING?
You will not be paid for being in this research study.
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WHO IS FUNDING THE STUDY?
The University of North Dakota and the research team are receiving no payments from
other agencies, organizations, or companies to conduct this research study.
CONFIDENTIALITY
The records of this study will be kept private to the extent permitted by law. In any report
about this study that might be published, you will not be identified. The data and consents
will be kept a minimum of three years from the end of the study. Your study record may
be reviewed by Government agencies, the UND Research Development and Compliance
office, and the University of North Dakota Institutional Review Board.
Any information that is obtained in this study and that can be identified with you will
remain confidential and will be disclosed only with your permission or as required by law.
Confidentiality will be maintained by means of anonymity within the written report and
subsequent published reports. Answers given to interview questions, and when reported
within study, will be coded in a manor that eliminates individuality. The data gathered
from the interview process will be digitized, moved to a data storage device, and stored in
a lockable safe by the principal investigator who will have sole access along with the
University of North Dakota Institutional Review Board auditors, and paper copies
destroyed.
If we write a report or article about this study, we will describe the study results in a
summarized manner so that you cannot be identified.
After interviews have been conducted, you have the right to review the recordings and
change or revise your answers. The principal investigator has sole access, the information
will be using for educational purposes only and the recordings will be destroyed at the
appropriate time.
IS THIS STUDY VOLUNTARY?
Your participation is voluntary. You may choose not to participate or you may
discontinue your participation at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which
you are otherwise entitled. Your decision whether or not to participate will not affect
your current or future relations with the University of North Dakota
CONTACTS AND QUESTIONS?
The researcher conducting this study is Gregory Bodensteiner. You may ask any
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questions you have now. If you later have questions, concerns, or complaints about the
research please contact Gregory Bodensteiner at 701.899.4023 or the research faculty
advisor, Joseph Vacek J.D., at 701.732.0736.
If you have questions regarding your rights as a research subject, you may contact The
University of North Dakota Institutional Review Board at (701) 777-4279.
• You may also call this number about any problems, complaints, or concerns you have

about this research study.
• You may also call this number if you cannot reach research staff, or you wish to talk

with someone who is independent of the research team.
• General information about being a research subject can be found by clicking
“Information for Research Participants” on the web site:
http://und.edu/research/resources/human-subjects/research-participants.cfm
I give consent to be audiotaped during this study.
Yes
No
I give consent for my quotes to be used in the research: however I will not be identified.
Yes
No
Your signature indicates that this research study has been explained to you, that your
questions have been answered, and that you agree to take part in this study. You will
receive a copy of this form.
Participants Name:
Date:
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Appendix B
Interview Protocol
Protocol
• At the onset of the interview, which is being conducted over the phone at the participants
convenience and comfort, participants will be notified that the conversation will be
recorded for further coding and analysis and all information exchanged unless
specifically stated will be used for data.
• Participant answers will not be directly quoted without permission given in the consent
form and if quoted will remain anonymous within the research with no identifying
information associated with responses.
• Do you agree to have the interview recorded for educational purposes?
• Are you in a place that is reasonably quiet and comfortable?
• As stated in the consent form, do you agree to have answers quoted?
• This interview and your participation is voluntary, and you can therefore choose not to
answer any or all of the questions and leave the interview at any time.
• This interview may take approximately 90 minutes to complete.
Interview Questions
1) Explanation of study and Warm up Questions:
a) How long have you been in the sport?
b) What roles have you held? What jobs have you held in the community or industry?
c) How many skydives do you have?
d) Do you participate in the high-performance landing discipline?
i) Have you sustained any injuries related to it?
ii) Do you personally know others that have been injured or have passed?
2) The community perception, from what I’ve gathered by word of mouth or from Parachutist,
is that landing fatalities have risen, (why do you think this belief exists)/(what do you feel is
going on)?
a) Do you agree with community perception? Why/why not?
b) What do you see as possible contributing factors, skydiver characteristics, or
environmental factors to landing fatalities?
c) In your experience, what have you perceived that leads you to believe that such a factor
or factors are important?
i) Would you please describe a particular event or experience?
3) What have you observed that explains high-performance landing fatalities and incidents?
a) Would you please describe your experience in detail?
b) What do you feel supports your notion?
4) How would you define experience, an experienced skydiver, or a skydiver with good versus
bad experience?
a) How would you define advanced equipment or maneuvers?
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b) In your own words, how would you describe a high-performance landing?
c) At what point would you consider a landing high-performance or high risk?
5) What are your opinions on the amount of experience, or experience level a skydiver should
have before undertaking advanced canopy maneuvers?
a) How do you feel this affects the community or the participants?
b) What are your thoughts on the level of experience being accepted by the community?
c) Unlike rules and recommendations for camera and wingsuit use, there are no specific
rules, recommendations, or licenses for a skydiver to pursue advanced canopy piloting.
Based on your thoughts before regarding experience and acceptance, is this sufficient?
6) Beginning 2012, new rules were added to for the B license. What are your thoughts on the
new rules and the impact on the high-performance landing discipline?
a) What do you feel could be done about these accidents at the advanced level?
7) How do you see the high-performance landing discipline fitting into the advancement of the
sport?
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